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Assuming that Russia's elections are held as scheduled on December 12, most voters 
will be required to cast up to six separate ballots: For the State Duma, the lower house 
of the new Federal Assembly, two votes will be required, since half of the Duma's 450 
members are to be elected in 225 single member districts and the other half by 
proportional representation at large (with party lists competing in Russia as a whole). 
Thus, separate votes will have to be cast for an individual Duma candidate and for a 
Duma party list. In the case of the Federal Council, the upper house, each of its 88 
current electoral regions will vote for two members and every elector will be entitled to 
cast up to two ballots. Simultaneously, Russia's new constitution will be submitted to a 
referendum and some regional councils will also be chosen.
The number of competing parties and blocs of parties at this time appears to be large, 
moreover with a bewildering array of labels, which in many instances look well-nigh 
identical while representing quite different segments of the political spectrum. (In case 
the Russian voter manages somehow to decipher which of the Duma' s at-large lists 
represents what platform, candidates for the Duma's single-member constituencies and 
for the Federation Council will be running without stated party affiliation.) Russia's 
emerging "electoral culture" dates back at most to 1991, when Yel'tsin defeated five 
other candidates in the elections for the Russian presidency. Thus, an enormous burden 
is being placed upon an inexperienced electorate that, in any case, has been compelled 
to devote most of its attention to the struggle for economic survival and whose political 
consciousness might have been enhanced by exposure to an electoral campaign had a 
reasonable period been allocated (discussed below).
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Invalidation of Elections
If fewer than two party lists succeed in meeting this deadline (presumably because of 
inability to gather 100,000 signatures), the Duma's at-large contests are to be 
invalidated and all the single-member constituencies are supposed to be turned into 
two-member constituencies. (The 100,000-signature barrier, of course, constitutes a 
significant hurdle only if a serious effort is made to validate all of the relevant signatures 
which, in the case of more than a score of different party lists, may amount to a total of 
several million.)
Initially, registration for the Duma was supposed to take place no later than 40 days (27 
days for the Federation Council) before elections, i.e., November 2 . Yel'tsin rejected 
requests to have the date of the elections postponed so as to avoid telescoping the 
campaign period into a mere 3 4 weeks . Instead, the period for collecting the required 
number of signatures appears to have been extended by a week (two weeks for Duma 
single-member constituencies). If at least two party lists fail to comply with this deadline 
(presumably because of inability to gather 100,000 signatures),the Duma's at-large 
contests are to be invalidated and all the single member constituencies are supposed to 
be turned into two member constituencies.
However, to compete in an individual Duma constituency, a candidate (unless 
nominated by a registered party) must gather the signatures of at least 1% (originally 
2%) of that district's electorate--a proportion over 10 times as high as the percentage 
needed for the all-Russian lists. (In the case of the Federation Council, similar 
provisions apply.) For single- or double-member constituencies, precisely the same time 
constraints prevail as for the Duma's at-large elections. Consequently, the identical 
scenarios that might lead to the invalidation of the at-large contests are likely also to 
affect individual constituencies. (The only mitigating factor is that individuals are free to 
give their signatures to more than a single party or candidate.)
Even once these initial hurdles have been overcome and the electoral process has 
been initiated, further major obstacles have to be surmounted. If before election day 
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only a single candidate is left to contest a single-member constituency (or only two 
candidates in a double-member constituency), the election in that area is to be 
postponed for 12 weeks. Moreover, if fewer than 25% of registered voters in all of 
Russia participate, the elections will be invalidated altogether, while failure of the same 
percentage of the electorate to participate in any individual constituency will nullify the 
election there. Additionally, to win any of Russia's at-large seats, a political party or bloc 
must obtain at least 5% of the eligible votes. If fewer than two parties manage to 
surmount this hurdle, the at-large elections are invalidated. (In this instance, as in the 
case of failure of at-large lists to obtain 100,000 signatures, the single-member 
constituencies are to elect two members each.)
"None of the Above"
This does not exhaust the list of potential pitfalls. For reasons about which one might 
speculate, an additional category has been added to the ballots for all elections to both 
houses of the Federation Assembly, namely "none of the above" (actually, "against all 
candidates/lists"). In the case of the at-large Russian party lists, the elections shall be 
invalid if the number of votes cast for "none of the above" exceeds the total number of 
votes for all of the lists. Where single- (or double-) member constituencies are 
concerned, the election in the individual constituency shall be invalidated if the number 
of votes cast for "none of the above" exceeds the number of votes cast for the leading 
candidate (respectively, two leading candidates). In the case of the Federation Council, 
the leading candidate may be elected if the number of votes cast for "none of the 
above" exceeds only the number obtained by the candidate with the second highest 
tally. (presumably, a supplementary election would be needed to fill that second seat.)
It may be that this peculiar provision is due partly to historic and partly to tactical 
considerations. During the Soviet period, to vote for a candidate involved crossing out 
all the other names. Consequently, in the 1990 elections for the USSR Congress of 
People' s Deputies, there were instances in which a candidate running unopposed lost 
because a majority of the voters crossed out his name. The current provision may be a 
derivative of this custom. However, another consideration may be involved: In case 
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voters were tempted to stay home on December 12 because of a "plague on all your 
houses" sentiment, some members of this group could be induced to participate 
because the same sentiment could be expressed more clearly by voting "none of the 
above." Their number might suffice to bring the percentage of the active electorate 
above the required minimum of 25%; on the other hand, a large turnout by "none of the 
above" voters might swamp the "positive" ballots sufficiently to invalidate the vote in 
individual electoral districts.
In any case, the various provisions listed here demonstrate that the potential for 
invalidation of Russia's elections, entirely or in part, is considerable.
Constant Tinkering
It may be noted that several recent revisions of the newly drafted electoral law are 
mentioned in this article, such as the halving of the number of signatures required to 
register a party list or individual candidacy and the postponement of the final date for 
registration, whittling down the number of days remaining for the actual campaign. 
These and other significant modifications are the result of constant tinkering with the 
clauses and a tendency to improvise, confusing not merely the inexperienced 
electorate, but even members of the electoral commission who contradict themselves 
and each other from time to time.
Consequently, the supposedly final version of the text contains outright errors. Thus 
Annex III of the Duma electoral law demonstrates the mechanics of the particular 
formula of proportionality applicable to the 225 at-large seats. An example is presented 
of six parties and the hypothetical votes each obtained; the available seats are 
apportioned between them, each party successfully garnering some. That is very nice, 
of course, except that the smallest of these hypothetical parties received only 4% of the 
votes and the electoral law requires a 5% minimum for allocation of at large seats!
To be sure, some of the improvisation has been due to events unrelated to the electoral 
law itself: Thus, it had been intended that the Federation Council be nominated by the 
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executive and legislative authorities in Russia's various regions. However, as a result of 
the questionable attitude of many of these regional authorities during October's armed 
rebellion, it was decided to hold elections instead.
Superficially, Russia's electoral system bears close resemblance to Germany's, both 
countries electing half of the lower house membership in single-member constituencies 
and the other half by proportional representation of party lists obtaining more than 5% of 
the vote. Germany's current system has proven highly successful and this fact 
undoubtedly influenced the authors of Russia's law. However, the discrepancies are far 
from minor. The German law contains none of the many provisions under which 
Russian elections can be invalidated. Neither the 25% minimal turnout of the electorate 
is required nor is there "none of the above" clause. German parties and candidates do 
not have to collect a large number of signatures to compete. The time allocated for the 
election campaign is quite adequate -- neither too short nor too long.
Apart from the constitutional differences -- the Bundestag enjoys much more power than 
the prospective Duma, while the Bundesrat is a much weaker body than the Federal 
Council -- the allocation of seats follows entirely different rules. In Germany, the number 
of seats obtained by a party in the single-member constituencies is subtracted (from the 
total to which it is entitled in proportion to its vote) before the additional at-large seats 
are allocated. Under Russia's law the at-large seats are apportioned according to the 
percentage of votes obtained by a party list, without taking into consideration the single-
member constituencies won by that party's individual candidates.
The mathematical formula applied in Germany's proportional representation follows the 
d'Hondt "highest average" method, which tends to favor the larger parties, whereas 
Russia, for reasons unknown is applying a unique formula that will favor smaller parties 
in determining how many seats are allocated to each party list. This factor will make it 
more difficult for Russia's largest party to obtain an absolute majority in the new Duma. 
In this case, as in the clause that annuls the elections even though one party has 
overcome the 5% hurdle, one has to assume that he authors were haunted by the 
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specter of the CPSU and its manipulation of the "elections", rather than anticipating a 
genuinely democratic electoral bloc winning a stable majority. The most democratic 
elements in Russia's arena appear to be particularly obsessed by this nightmare, since 
several have objected to the validation of political parties by means of signatures 
accompanied by ID numbers, lest these be used as written evidence if Russia were to 
revert to the repressive habits of the past.
An Edge for Leaders
Some trouble has been taken to give an edge to leaders of the various parties. Thus 
(presumably prominent) individuals may compete both on the at-large lists and in the 
individual constituencies. A candidate winning in both will take his/her seat in the 
individual constituency, thus vacating a slot on the at-large list. In order to allow for such 
eventualities, parties may overload their at-large lists with up to 270 candidates for 225 
seats.
Until the recent untoward events the "separation of powers" had been a fetish for 
Russian democrats. Thus, the original draft of he electoral law had devoted a special 
paragraph to the "Incompatibility of a Deputy's Status With an Official Position or Work 
in State or Other Bodies." However, in light of the deadlock created by the old Congress 
of People's Deputies, and in order to strengthen Russia's Choice, the bloc of Yel'tsin's 
supporters, by the inclusion of prominent names, members of the presidential apparatus 
are competing for seats in the Federal Assembly, negating, in effect, the "separation of 
powers." Members of the Council of Ministers have joined other reformist coalitions. 
Significantly, several officials have tried to have it both ways, taking leaves of absence 
from their posts, but keeping open the possibility that they may resign their newly 
gained seats in parliament to return to their positions -- after attracting votes to the party  
lists on which their names appeared.
An unusual provision in the electoral law permits parties -- without obligating them -- to 
divide their at-large lists for the Duma between candidates nominated to compete in 
Russia as a whole and others who will be competing in very sizable geographic 
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subdivisions of Russia (e.g., the Urals, Siberia, the Black Earth Zone, or any other 
subdivision a party might desire to create for this purpose).
For example, a party may place its top 15 names on the all-Russian portion of its at-
large list, another 6 on the Urals portion, another 4 on the Siberian portion, etc. If, in 
proportion to the percentage of the total votes it obtained, it is entitled to a total of 21 at-
large seats, all the 15 names on the all-Russian portion will be elected, and the 
remaining 6 will be drawn from the various geographical subdivisions (in proportion to 
the vote obtained by that party in each of those subdivisions). While the intention behind 
this provision is laudable (presumably, to approximate the German system whereby at-
large seats are allocated separately in each of the 16 Lander), it creates further delays 
in an already foreshortened pre-election period; various parties may create different 
subdivisions, thus expanding exponentially the number of different regional ballots that 
would have to be printed in a Russia which still used Linotype outside its urban centers.
One of the many problems of the electoral system is its unnecessary complexity which 
makes it very hard for he voter to comprehend particularly in an electorate that has little 
experience of the democratic process. (this begs for an unusually large number of 
spoiled ballots and for a high rate of abstention from voting.) The degree of this 
convolution is indicated by the difficulty its authors have had in coming up with a lucid 
explanation. Adoption of Germany's electoral system without the "excess baggage" 
might have made more sense.
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